Modern armed conflicts have a tendency to spill across state boundaries as armed groups relocate to countries where there is less military capacity or political inclination to fight them. Thus far, the spatial diffusion of these conflicts has remained under-explored. To fill this gap, this article presents a new Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) that measures the intensity and spatial concentration of political violence at the subnational level from 1997 to 2019. This new resource leverages data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) from 1997-2019. Applied to the case of North and West Africa, the new spatial indicator shows which regions experience the most conflicts, how conflicts change geographically over time, and how foreign interventions affect the geography of conflicts.
Introduction
Modern conflicts have a tendency to spill across state boundaries (Salehyan 2009 ). Faced with increasing pressure from government forces, armed groups often relocate to countries where there is less military capacity or political inclination to fight them (Skillicorn et al. 2019) . Where borders are porous, borderlands are used as safe havens from which attacks can be conducted, new recruits can be found, and civilians can be targeted. This is particularly evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, where rebellions and insurgencies are rarely contained within one state (Walther and Miles 2018) . In northern Nigeria, for example, the joint counter-offensive led by Nigeria and its regional allies has led the Jihadist organization Boko Haram to develop its activities in neighboring Niger and Cameroon since the mid-2010s (Thurston 2018) . Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has followed a similar evolution: expelled from northern Algeria by government forces, the Jihadist organization has first relocated to Mali in the mid-2000s, before moving to neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger in recent years.
Over the last decade, numerous new political event datasets have been developed to track the location and timing of violence and, presumably, to facilitate investigations of the factors that contribute to fuel these conflicts. Yet, a major obstacle to a more comprehensive understanding of the geography of conflict has been the lack of analytic techniques designed for such spacetime event data and that aim for more than a descriptive mapping of the presence or absence of violence . For example, analysts may wish to know whether political violence in a given location has increased or diminished in intensity over time or if it has contracted or spread geographically across a region. The aim of this article is to address this gap by introducing a new spatial indicator designed for use with political event data that incorporates two fundamental spatial dimensions of political violence: intensity and concentration. Intensity, or the amount of violence within a region, can increase or decrease over time according to the military capabilities and political strategies of the actors in a conflict. Concentration, or how violent events are distributed spatially, considers whether events are diffused across a region or, conversely, concentrated on a limited space.
The new Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) was developed with these concerns in mind and can leverage political event data from most space-time event datasets, such as the widelyused Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010) . Based on a uniform gridded geography of cells, the SCDi can be used for comparisons across multi-state regions or within a single state context, using any size or configuration of underlying areas for analysis and utilizing any temporal duration desired. In this paper, we illustrate the SCDi with an application to the case of North and West Africa, analyzing over 30,000 discrete events through a 22-year time span and across a 21-state geographical area. We use the SCDi to not just show which regions or places experience the most conflicts but to also demonstrate how conflicts can take on different geographic properties and how these properties can change over time.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss recent efforts to develop new spatially disaggregated event datasets that capture the temporal and spatial dynamics of wars and conflicts and highlight the contribution of the SCDi to this burgeoning literature. We then describe the indicator in detail. Using ACLED data, we show its potential in describing the longterm spatial evolution of conflicts in North and West Africa as well as the impact of foreign military interventions. Our conclusion highlights the key contributions and limitations of our new indicator and avenues for future research.
Motivation for a new indicator
The past decade has yielded a greater emphasis on developing geographically referenced political event data (e.g., Schrodt and Yonamine 2013) . While past analyses on conflict were conceptually limited by state-centric approaches and a general lack of reliable data at the substate level, contemporary studies often build on so-called 'spatially-disaggregated' event data to investigate the onset, duration, and subnational geographies of armed conflicts (Buhaug and Rød 2006 , Tollefsen et al. 2012 . In this literature, spatially-disaggregated refers to information about an event that has as much geographic (and temporal) specificity as possible about precisely where (and when) an event occurred. Numerous disaggregated datasets that track expressions of political violence have now proliferated, including the Global Terrorism Database (Lafree and Dugan 2007) , the aforementioned ACLED, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Sundberg and Melander 2013) . In these datasets, events are 'geocoded' or assigned geographic coordinates which allows them to be mapped using a geographic information system (GIS).
Other thematic geocoded datasets have also multiplied over recent years. For example, the traditional militarized interstate dispute data commonly used in international relations were geocoded by Braithwaite (2010) as the Militarized Interstate Dispute Location or MIDLOC dataset. Particular attention was paid to ethnic politics and armed conflicts with the introduction of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) datasets (Wimmer et al. 2009 , Weidmann et al. 2010 , Vogt et al. 2015 , whose geocoded version is known as GeoEPR (Wucherpfenning et al. 2011) . Other recently introduced geocoded datasets include the Geo-PKO dataset on peacekeeping operations (Cil et al. 2019) , the Ethnic One-Sided Violence dataset on civilian victims , the Security-Force Ethnicity (SFE) dataset on military forces in the Middle East (Johnson and Thurber 2017) , and the Leadership Changes in Rebel Groups dataset (Lutmar and Terris 2019) .
An advantage of such geocoded data is that they are delinked from any underlying administrative area. In the parlance of spatial analysis and GIS, they are encoded as spatial point data rather than assigned as attributes to two-dimensional geographic areas. This means that they can potentially be combined with other spatial organized datasets in different ways or at varying levels for investigation and analysis. For example, the literature often models geocoded event data as a function of different substate/local demographic, political, and economic measures, including factors as diverse as the nature of government, population composition, ethnic divisions, poverty, income, inequality, or number and morale of troops (Hegre et al. 2009, Deny and Walter 2014) . Environmental factors such as rainfall and temperature variability, visibility and windy conditions, frequency of droughts, and endowment of natural resources are also used to predict episodes of organized violence around the world (Braithwaite and Li 2007 , Carter and Veale 2013 , Marineau et al. 2019 . This is the underlying approach of efforts like the Violence Early-Warning System (ViEWS) project (Hegre et al. 2019 ). Such modeling efforts use a de facto assumption about the relationships between the location of violence and its milieu or setting. Although the role of geography as an influence on human agency has been contested, the incorporation of contextual locational information recognizes that the resources for political action will always vary geographically and that many influences on agency can be observed and measured in the sites in which a political event occurs. There remain issues with incorporating geography into the modeling of political violence, such as assumptions that the relationships between context and action are stationary across a geographic region (see Radil 2019) . Nonetheless, disaggregated geocoded events are now the standard in the literature as they are understood to provide a means to incorporate other geospatial data for modeling purposes.
While geolocated event data are now common for the reasons described above, the geography of a set of events itself is rarely a point of investigation in the literature beyond a basic descriptive mapping of event locations. This means that the inherent spatiality of political event data is largely underexplored even though it is suitable for the application of the techniques of point pattern analysis, or PPA. PPA is a set of methods used to detect patterns among a set of locations (e.g., Fotheringham et al. 2007 ) and is concerned with the fundamental spatial properties about the locations of a group of points in two-dimensional geographic space. For example, should a group of violent events be expected to present any form of geographical arrangement, such as clustering or dispersion? Although the tools of point pattern analysis are well developed, they are rarely applied to events of political violence (see O'Loughlin and Witmer 2011 and Zammit-Mangion et al. 2013 for important exceptions).
Such investigations of the spatiality of political event data is necessary to approach other important questions, such as how political violence spreads geographically. Although the literature has established that rough terrain (Hendrix 2011) , the proximity to porous borders (Walther and Miles 2018) , the structure of the road network (Zhukov 2012) , and the distance from centers of political power are among the many factors that can facilitate or limit the mobility of rebel groups and state forces , Buhaug 2010 , the overall process of the diffusion of violence is understudied. Studies such as Buhaug and Gates's (2002) finding that separatist groups tend to fight further from the capital than revolutionary groups do have led to assumptions of simple and uniform spatial mechanisms of diffusion of political violence: it first builds in the rural 'hinterlands' and then moves to the seats of power, often in large urban settings (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Collier et al. 2009 ). A thorough treatment of the spatial distribution of political event data would be an important first step in assessing the question of diffusion in different political contexts.
In sum, investigations of the geography of disaggregated and geocoded political event data has lagged behind other applications, such as using event locations to link to other spatial datasets for modeling purposes. Further, while the factors that explain why civil wars and conflicts start and evolve have been addressed, the processes involved in the spatial diffusion of political violence remain under-explored. These are the animating issues behind our efforts to develop approaches that could describe and model the shifting geography of political violence apart from the basic mapping of political event patterns. The result of our efforts is called the Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) and it was expressly designed to help fill this gap.
The Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator of political violence
The SCDi draws on the ideas and techniques of PPA and is comprised of two separate and complementary metrics that focus on two interrelated but different spatial properties of violence: the relative intensity of conflict within a region or zone (spatial density) and the distribution of conflict locations relative to each other (spatial concentration). In the language of PPA, intensity is a 'first-order' property of a point pattern that provides a local insight (where do the patterns differ?) while concentration is a 'second-order' property that provides a global insight (is the pattern generally clustered, regular, or dispersed) (Ripley 1981) . The methods used for both metrics are described below followed by a discussion of how they are combined by the SCDi.
Measuring the intensity of violence
A first-order property of a point pattern refers to the intensity of the underlying process that produces points across a study area and is concerned with the variation in location of the points across the study area. The intensity of conflict events can be estimated from a point pattern's observed density which is measured as the density of violent events per square kilometre. Normally, the density (λ) is calculated as a count of events in region i for a defined time period divided by the measurement of the region's area. Figure 1 shows how the density of violence varies according to the number of violent events within a hypothetical region divided into six cells of 10 square km. In this way, density measures can help identify local differences in the intensity of events across the larger region. Of course, density measures can also help identify local changes to the intensity of violence over time as well. From this perspective, the density measure is useful to understanding trends in violence over time and the implications of intensifying violence in certain cells or zones. For example, if an increase in the number of violent events takes place adjacent to an international boundary, this may indicate the conflict process is becoming regionalized or preparing to spread. The SCDi measures the overall conflict intensity (CI) within a given region without measuring the absolute location of violence events within the region. Because the number of events is standardized by the amount of area within the region, it produces a metric that can be used to compare areas of any size. The CI measure has a lower bound of 0 when there are no events within the region during a given year and no upper bound. As the measure increases from 0, it reflects a higher intensity of events within the region.
Classifying a CI score for a region as higher or lower than expected is also possible. To do this, a cutoff value must be established to create a threshold value. This can be done by first dividing a region into a number of cells and calculating the CI score for every cell for every year during the period considered. The next step is to calculate the mean CI score (excluding zeros) over that time span. This resulted in what is called the CI 'generational mean' or the average conflict intensity. Therefore, a region has a high density if it is greater than the generational mean and a low density otherwise.
Measuring the concentration of violence
A second-order property of a point pattern refers to the relative concentration of points to each other across a study area and is concerned with whether points are clustered together or dispersed from each other. The concentration of conflict events can be estimated from a point pattern's observed average distance between each point and its nearest point. In this way, concentration measures can help identify global tendencies in how points are realized across the larger region, keeping in mind that conflicts can disseminate spatially without necessarily increasing the number of violent events or fatalities (Lohman and Flint 2010) . This spatial dispersion occurs when a given number of events takes place on a much larger territory than before. When dispersion occurs internationally, conflicts tend to relocate rather than regionalize. The opposite of dispersion is contraction, which occurs, for example, when government forces push insurgents into remote areas.
The SCD indicator uses the average nearest neighbor analysis (Chainey and Ratcliffe 2013) to determine if violent events are dispersed, clustered or randomly distributed. This metric first measures the distance between each violent incident in a region and its nearest neighbor's location. It then averages all these nearest neighbor distances. The distribution is considered clustered if the average distance is smaller than the one for a random distribution and considered dispersed otherwise.
The average nearest neighbor ratio (ANN) determines whether the patterns of violent events exhibit clustering or dispersion. It is calculated as the observed average distance among a set of points in a cell divided by the expected average distance that would have been obtained if the events were distributed randomly within that cell (ESRI 2019). In the example below ( Figure 2 ), for example, ten randomly placed events would exhibit an average nearest neighbor distance of 12 km. ANN ratios smaller than one indicate clustered events while ratios greater than one indicate dispersed events. The distribution of events on the left-hand side of Figure 2 , for example, is clustered compared with a random distribution of the same number of events, as shown by its ratio of 0.5. The distribution on the right-hand side is dispersed, with a ratio of 1.5. Figure 2 . Clustered, random, and dispersed events as measured by the ANN ratio.
Source: authors
The SCDi measures the overall location of violence within a given region but is not a measure of intensity within the region. For the purposes of this indicator, conflict concentration (CC) is only calculated on regions where the number of events was 2 or more in a given year (1-event regions are excluded as the both the observed and expected distances between events cannot be meaningful derived). When the number of events is 2 or more, the CC metric has a lower bound of 0 with no conceptual upper bound. A score of 0 would represent a series of events at the exact same location and therefore an extreme geographic clustering of events together in a region. A score of 1 would represent a random pattern of event locations as some would be near each other with others far away. Overall, there would be no detectible locational pattern. A score more than 1 would represent the relative dispersion of events across the region as they will be further apart from each other than expected by chance. In short, CC scores lower than 1 can be classified as clustered and scores higher than 1 classified as dispersed.
Four conflict geographies
The SCDi identifies four types of conflict according to whether violence is more or less intense or diffuse, and dispersed or clustered ( Table 1 ). The first type applies to regions where there are an above average intensity and a clustered distribution of violent events, suggesting that violence is intensifying locally. The second type is when a conflict is characterized by a higher than average intensity and a dispersed distribution of events, indicating that the violence is accelerating. The third type applies to regions where there are fewer violent activities and most of them take place near each other, possibly indicating a decreasing range of violent groups. The fourth type, in which a lower than average intensity and a dispersed distribution of events are combined, suggests that a conflict is lingering. This situation may be indicative of a region in which opponents are highly mobile or are unlikely to face protracted opposition in a given locality. 
An application to North and West Africa
The SCDi is applied to North and West Africa, a region where, since the early 2000s, a mix of ethnic rebel groups, transnational extremist organizations, and self-defense militias has challenged the legitimacy of several states in North and West Africa (OECD 2020). The region's governments are increasingly confronted with non-state actors that tend to relocate to other countries when defeated by counter-insurgency efforts. The geographic spread and opportunistic relocation of such conflicts is amplified by the lack of controls on many African borders that facilitate the circulation of fighters, hostages and weapons. In this section, we describe how the SCDi can contribute to understand changes in the geography of conflict in the region over the last 20 years.
Data source
The SCD indicator can leverage spatial data from most disaggregated datasets. In this paper, we use event data from the ACLED project, which provides detailed and georeferenced information on actors in conflict without imposing a threshold on the number of fatalities recorded for each event (Raleigh et al. 2010) . It is applied to 5 North African countries (Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and the Western Sahara) and 17 West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo) from January 1997 to June 2019.
The indicator focuses on the three categories of events classified as violent by ACLED: battles, explosions and remote violence, and violence against civilians (Table 2) . During the period of observation, these 30,360 events have involved 2551 unique organizations and caused 138,207 fatalities. Demonstrations and non-violent events such as agreements, arrests, disrupted weapons use, headquarters established, looting and non-violent transfer of territory are excluded from the analysis. • A battle is "a violent interaction between two politically organized armed groups at a particular time and location" (ACLED 2019b: 7). Battles can occur between any state and non-state actors and involve at least two armed and organized actors. Violence against civilians is categorized separately although civilians can be harmed as an indirect result from battles. This category includes events that did not cause fatalities. Battles are subdivided into three sub-event types, depending on whether non-state actors or government forces overtake territory or whether there is no territorial change.
• Explosions/Remote violence are "one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the target to respond" (ACLED 2019b: 9). Explosions/Remote violence can be carried out using devices such as bombs, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), artillery fire or shelling, missile attacks, heavy machine gun fire, air or drone strikes, or chemical weapons.
• Violence against civilians is defined as "violent events where an organized armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. By definition, civilians are unarmed and cannot engage in political violence. The perpetrators of such acts include state forces and their affiliates, rebels, militias, and external/other forces" (ACLED 2019b: 11). Violence against civilians include beating, shooting, torture, rape, mutilation, kidnapping and disappearances of civilian actors.
Choosing the right grid for the region
The new indicator divides North and West Africa into a uniform grid of 6540 "cells" or "regions" of 50 by 50 km. Each grid cell encompasses the same amount of land area (2,500 square km). Alternative cell sizes were explored (Map 1). For example, using a much smaller grid of 10 by 10 km would have potentially provided a more granular location of violent events. However, because political violence is geographically clustered in a limited number of regions, 99% of the cells would have been empty in 2018. Of the 1% of cells that would have had events within them, only 40% would have had more than one event. The indicator would not have been particularly meaningful with such small numbers of points in each cell. Larger cells such as a 100 by 100 km grid would have aggregated distant events that would not be necessarily linked to one another.
By comparison, the 50 by 50 km grid provides a balanced approach to these issues. Each cell in the grid is large enough to aggregate a sufficient number of violent events for meaningful analysis while still small enough to provide a localized assessment of political violence across the region. This allows comparing the evolution of conflicts from Dakar to N'Djamena, and from Lomé to Algiers. It also provides a much more homogeneous representation of violence than existing administrative units, whose size differs enormously across countries and bioclimatic zones. Administrative regions tend to be much bigger in the sparsely populated Sahara than anywhere else, for example, which would greatly affect the density and diffusion of violent events.
Map 1. Size of grids and number of events by cells
Source: authors based on ACLED data.
The grid is first overlaid onto the event locations and then used to determine the two separate calculations needed for the indicator: the spatial density of events per cell and the concentration of event locations within each cell. In North and West Africa, the CI generational mean was 0.0017 events per square kilometer between 1997 and 2016. Given that the study uses a region of 2,500 square km, a low-density region is one with four or fewer events in a calendar year. These calculations are completed using arcpy, a library for Python 2.7 that interacts with ArcGIS. This script, developed by the research team, primarily consists of two nested loops that calculated the spatial density and the concentration of event locations for each cell, year, and type of event.
Because the clustering calculation requires a minimum input of two points, the script also selects only the cells that contained more than one violent event within them. The resulting output for any given year is a new fishnet grid with the density and clustering measures for each cell containing two or more events. Using ArcGIS, the study then uses the resulting grids to map the results across the region.
More regions are experiencing intense violence
Applying the CI metric to every grid by year shows how the geography of conflict had changed in the region. For example, in 1997, most of the violence was within Sierra Leone with small pockets along the Algerian and Nigerian coasts. However, in 2018, violence has shifted and amplified with Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Libya all experiencing concentrated areas of intense violence (Map 2). Not only has the location of violence shifted over time, but the number of regions experiencing violence has been multiplied by 5: In 1997, 85 regions had two or more events but in 2018 that number increased to 433. In the context of this study, that represents slightly more than a 500% increase in the total number of regions with violence. This increase is consistent when considering regions of both high-and low-intensity. The mix of high-and low-intensity violence regions are nearly the same between the years (59% high in 1997, 55% high in 2018).
Map 2. Intensity of conflict in North and West Africa, 2018
Violence patterns have become more dispersed
Conflict is largely localized and events are more likely to occur near one another in North and West Africa: the average percentage of clustered regions (CC < 1) is nearly 91% over the period considered. As a side effect of this geography, the sundry negative impacts of violence are more likely to be felt in the same places repeatedly. In recent years, however, the percentage of regions that exhibit clustering of violence has dropped from 95% in 2011 to 82% in 2018 which may indicate that violence is become more slightly dispersed. This is a likely consequence of shifting tactics, including the marked increase in the numbers of attacks against civilians as these events are less likely to occur in similar locations over time.
Regions with dispersed violence locations are a particular cause for concern because they may be evidence of the spread of conflict to a new area from a neighboring region. Conversely, a dispersed pattern may be evidence that a conflict is weakening or that one party is dominant in a region, as fewer violent events occur in nearby locations. In other words, a dispersed pattern can identify regions where a transition is underway in either direction. Alarmingly, the percentage of regions in 2018 with dispersed events (CC > 1) is nearly 17%, the highest percentage of the 23 years of data used in the study. This is 7% higher than the historical baseline between 1997 and 2016 and may be a sign of the incorporation of new places into the already intensely localized geography of conflicts. If correct, this would result in a negative feedback cycle by exposing more locations with the region to the effects of violence.
The relative locations of clustered and dispersed pattern regions have also shifted over time. For example, all of the major conflict areas (Map 3) across the study region include clustered regions in 2018. Over time, dispersed patterns have mostly been associated with conflict zones in Nigeria. The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria is also the country that has, by far, the largest number of violent events (9,017) and fatalities (67, 512) . Nigeria is home to three major sources of continuous violence that explain the unusual intensity and geographical extent of conflicts in the country: the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, communal violence in the Middle Belt, and the Niger Delta insurgency in the south. Taken together, these conflicts account for 30% of the violent events and half of the victims recorded in North and West Africa since 1997.
Map 3. Concentration of conflict in North and West Africa, 2018
The shifting geography of political violence
The SCDi confirms that the last 10 years have been marked by a strong increase in all types of conflicts in North and West Africa.
• The number of regions experiencing a local intensification of political violence (type 1) has increased significantly faster than other types of conflicts. These conflicts where violence is both clustered and intense are the most widespread in the region. Historically, this type has always been the most represented in North and West Africa but its proportion has continuously increased since the mid-2000s, from 38% in 2008 to more than half ten years later (Figure 1) . Nowadays, these regions often form the core of large epicenters of violence, as in central Mali, northern Burkina Faso, around Lake Chad, in the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta in Nigeria, and in Libya (Map 4).
Figure 1. Number of conflicts by type, 1997-2018
• Regions in which conflicts are accelerating (type 2), as showed by a high intensity of dispersed events are fortunately quite rare in the region. They concern only 3% of the cells, a proportion that has not changed much over the last 20 years. Several gaps with no cells of dispersed-high density are recorded, indicating that the acceleration of conflicts is a rather unusual occurrence in the region. These regions are located in the Inner Niger Delta in Mali, southern Nigeria, the Liptako-Gourma between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and the border region between Nigeria and Cameroon.
• The number of regions in which political violence is both clustered and of low density (type 3) has experienced a strong growth since 2010. This type concerns a third (31%) of the cells of the region. These conflict regions are less represented than in the mid-2000s, when they accounted for half of the conflict. They are often found on the periphery of more intense conflict zones, such as on the outskirts of major cities in Libya.
• Regions that experience lingering conflicts due to dispersed and low-intensity events (type 4) are also rare. This type is found in only 13% of the cells but the percentage of those regions has doubled over the last 10 years. These regions are located at the periphery of the major war zones or in some countries with fewer violent events, such as Ghana, Guinea or Algeria. • Regions where violence is both clustered and intense (type 1, CH) are likely to remain unchanged. The most common outcome is for a Clustered-High density region in one year to remain Clustered-High density in the following year, which occurs 70% of the time. This captures the likelihood for the continuation of a localized conflict over multiple years, a common occurrence in the various conflict zones in Nigeria for instance. However, the second most common outcome for a Clustered-High density region is to have no score the following year (19%), meaning that even intense localized conflicts can come to a rather abrupt end. The last meaningful shift is to Clustered-Low density (8%), which is interpreted as a transition state along the way to conflict deescalation. For example, many of the major cities in Libya (Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah, Al Khums) continue to have higher than average numbers of events year-to-year. Between 2017 and 2018, the event locations within those conflict zones remained clustered together within the city's extent rather than occurring at dispersed locations around the countryside.
• Regions where violence is clustered but of low intensity (type 3, CL) are likely to change for the better. The most common shifts for Clustered-Low density regions is to have no conflict the following year (70% of the time) or to become Clustered-High density (12%). This reinforces the idea that Clustered-Low density regions are in a state of transition and unlikely to persist year-to-year, which only happens 6% of the time. For example, several conflict regions in Yobe and Gombe states in northeast Nigeria changed from low intensity but clustered conflict locations in 2017 to no conflict the following year.
• Regions where violence is dispersed and intense (type 2, DH) are also likely to improve. These are the rarest regions in the study, a positive sign as they may represent both an intensifying and diffusing conflict. Helpfully, the most common outcome is for such regions to receive no score the following year (71%) which points to their instability. The other most common outcomes are to either remain unchanged or to shift to Clustered-High density (each happens 14% of the time • Regions that are not affected by conflicts are likely to remain peaceful but, when a change happens, it is likely to be a localized low intensity conflict (type 3, CL). Most regions never experience conflict over the study's time range. However, regions that shift from no score to one of the other categories are troubling as this resents a sudden introduction or re-introduction of conflict into a previously peaceful region. When conflict does emerge in a region where it was previously absent, it is most often as Clustered-Low density (51%). However, it also commonly jumps directly to Clustered-High density (42%). This is the worst possible outcome given the persistence of the Clustered-High density category over time. For example, several areas in the central part of Mali's Mopti region that had no conflict events in either 2016 or 2017 were classified as clustered and high intensity in 2018. When conflict emerged, it erupted into the category that has the most persistence over time.
The SCDi and foreign military interventions
Since the late 1990s, the countries of North and West Africa have experienced 20 major military interventions in 12 countries (OECD 2020). On a continent where state conflicts are rare, multinational organizations, military alliances and regional economic communities have launched the vast majority of the military interventions observed over the last 20 years. The SCDi can be used to understand how these military interventions have affected the geography of conflict in the region.
In this paper, we use the case of the intervention launched by Nigeria and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established with neighboring countries to counter Boko Haram (Albert 2017) to assess changes in the intensity and diffusion of conflict in the Lake Chad region.
Multinational events during which government forces from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger have collaborated on an attack against Boko Haram represent 5% of the 1671 events recorded in the ACLED database since 2015. Much of the joint military operations took place from January 2015 to December 2016. Taken together, these two years represent more than half of the events (52%) and 85% of the fatalities related to multinational operations in the region. The intervention against Boko Haram was also heavily concentrated in Borno State, where nearly three quarters of the events (72%) and half of the fatalities due to multinational operations have occurred, often in close proximity to Nigerian borders. Only 10-15% of the events and a quarter of the fatalities recorded since 2015 took place in Cameroon and in Niger respectively.
Our results show that the military intervention resulted in several major changes in the conflict between 2015 and 2016. Primarily, the number of violent events and fatalities involving Boko Haram demonstrated a strong decline since its peak in 2015. However, the task force struggled to produce a rapid shift in the overall geography. For instance, Figure 4 highlights that the regions that experienced more than two conflict events in a single month often continued to experience conflict in subsequent months. This means that a region with conflict of any type often took several months to result in the elimination of violence. As a result of this dynamic, regions in several states in Nigeria were the sites of repeated clashes between militants and the task force, specifically those in Adawama, Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe states (see Map 4).
The geography of violence was also not just more persistent in specific locations, it was also more diverse in terms of SCDi categories. The most common category throughout the intervention was low-intensity/concentrated. This reinforces the challenge faced by the task force in eliminating violence in the region. Violence tended to persist at lower levels around specific places for longer durations. Every month of the intervention had multiple regions classified as both high-intensity/concentrated and high-intensity/dispersed in addition to the higher numbers of low-intensity/concentrated regions. Violence within these other categories again proved difficult to end as they tended to change to the low-intensity/concentrated category month-tomonth rather than to be eliminated altogether. Violence reemerged in the middle of the intervention after an initial wave of success in its reduction. In July 2015, the number of regions experiencing violence nearly tripled from the previous month, due to large-scale military operations. As a result, the locations of violence in July of 2015 was quite similar to that in February 2015, when violence had previously peaked. By the end of 2015, this surge had again been reduced by more than 50%, while still persisting in Borno and Yobe states (Map 5).
Overall, the MNJTF's operations in 2015 reduced the number of events and fatalities to preintervention levels, which is to say that violence within the Lake Chad region remained quite high throughout. However, it neither eliminated nor relocated violence, although it may have served to confine violence spatially to the northeast during 2015. The primary geographic effect was to increase the number of locations with lower intensity violence as conflict was persistent in regions over time. Violence has continued since the intervention of 2015. While fatalities have not yet reached pre-intervention levels, the number of regions experiencing violence is now at levels not seen since the earliest months of 2015. Both numbers of high-intensity/concentrated and low-intensity/concentrated cells are at their peak relative to early 2015 ( Figure 5 ). Source: authors based on ACLED data. Note: this graph shows how many 50 km by 50 km "cells" or "regions" have experienced different types of conflict from January 2008 to July 2019 in northern Nigeria and around Lake Chad. Each type of conflict is defined according to its intensity and spatial distribution.
Conclusion
The Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) introduced in this article makes it possible to take into account the great diversity of current conflicts in the world. By combining two measures (density and concentration), the indicator contributes to identify regions that experience the most conflicts, assess whether conflicts tend to spread across the region, and measure to what extend foreign military interventions shape the geography of armed struggles. In North and West Africa, where it was applied for the first time, the SCDi also revealed several important elements about long-term political violence in the region that can inform analysts, policy officials and other stakeholders interested in the advancement of peace.
First, using the SCDi to track the long-term evolution of the geography of violence highlights that the location of violence is highly dynamic over time. Most of the major conflict areas of the 1990s are peaceful today and much of the current violence is observed in states that were considered stable 15 years ago. This shifting and relocating of political instability across international boundaries should encourage the research community to continue to track the locations of violence at a regional and multi-state scale. A focus on an individual country or even on a smaller set of states would have missed this essential character of political violence and perhaps fail to detect the direction and implications of such shifts when they occur. The SCDi developed in this paper is an example of a tool to monitor the larger patterns of violence regionally, keeping a watchful eye on the conditions that may be involved with the transitions from peace to violence and vice-versa.
Second, the SCDi illustrates how violence operates geographically over time. The recognition that violence can be differently concentrated while also varying by intensity provides policy makers a more nuanced understanding that can shape both governance strategies to deal with the circumstance and impact the relative efficacy of those efforts. For example, a highly clustered expression of violence will result in a different form of impacts on people and places that will a highly diffuse expression. Accordingly, relief and violence suppression efforts will necessarily need to take on a different character to effectively address each. Similarly, understanding the relative intensity of violence over time in the same place or area is an important metric of human security that stakeholders can use to assess the effectives of their response to violence. That the SCDi addresses both aspects of the geography of violence speaks to the potential utility of it as a response tool when there is an outbreak of violence.
Third, the SCDi showed how foreign interventions impacted the dynamics of conflict differently. In the Lake Chad region, the impact of the MNJTF intervention against Boko Haram was more complex to assess although the offensive launched by Nigeria and its neighbors did reduce the intensity of violence and limit it to remote areas. However, the locations of violence have since spread and resumed in intensity and having been more dispersed where it continues to occur. Overall, the SCDi showed how the interventions typically decreased the intensity of violence and kept violence from becoming dispersed where it was occurring but that this effect was temporary. This suggests that external military forces cannot be the primary means for countering an insurgency. The return of violence to the same locations as prior to an intervention illustrates that insurgencies emerge because of national or local grievances, real or perceived. This means that insurgencies must also be addressed through civil means within the countries in which they develop. The use of the SCDi helped to show how external military forces can create both spaces and moments of violence suppression but not durable solutions to the political circumstances that gave rise to the violence in the first place.
